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Abstract 
Food insecurity at the household level has become unacceptable in India where the economy is 
growing at high rates and food sufficiency is already achieved at the macro-level. Food security 
has always been an important issue in the Indian political economy and was addressed by 
numerous poverty-eradication and rural development programmes that emerged and evolved 
with time. In recent times of liberalization, the programmes are intended to be more targeted 
and integrated with other social objectives through innovative designing. In particular, the 
government is all set to using public works programme, which is nothing new to India or other 
developing countries, as a nationwide instrument to confer earning opportunity to rural people 
backed by legal reinforcement. This paper reviews the strategies and instruments in India that 
impinge on household food insecurity. The paper also examines how far the existing public 
works programmes in select four states target the households that are likely to be food insecure. 
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1 Introduction 
With the advance of agricultural technology, yield rates of food crops in the world and 
many developing countries have improved considerably and the food problem is no 
longer one of global or national food shortage (Pinstrup-Anderson 2002). However, 
household food insecurity associated with insufficient purchasing power may very well 
coexist with food abundance at global, national or even sub-national levels. It is, in fact, 
a form of extreme poverty that depletes the productive capacity inherent in people and 
creates a vicious circle of poverty and incapacity in which food-insecure households 
also tend to remain poor. Food is a ‘capability’. It is not only an end but also a means to 
a variety of ends (Harriss-White 1999; Sen 1995).  
Household food insecurity has conventionally been battled with mainstream 
employment and growth-oriented strategies that improve the purchasing power of 
households and thus ameliorate poverty. However, historically the conventional 
macroeconomic employment-generating state policies in a developing country most 
often failed to recognize the complex realities of the labour market (Braun 1995). Thus, 
they bypassed certain sections of the society, giving rise to inequality while poverty and 
food insecurity persisted. Similarly, the current process of structural adjustment and 
globalization that is expected to bridge areas of shortage and abundance not only within 
a country but also across countries through the smooth operation of market mechanism 
can do no better. They do provide benefit to many, but also leave many others worse 
off. The ‘losers’ are likely to be people who are (i) unskilled due to historical reasons, 
(ii) physically and economically too weak to compete or (iii) geographically 
disadvantaged with insufficient and inappropriate resources to utilize the opportunities 
offered by the market. Growth alone cannot correct the human specificities related to 
gender, geography, social class or disease. Many believe that mainstream strategies 
need to be accompanied by direct attempts to eliminate deprivation.  
Today, the choice of an appropriate strategy to combat poverty and food insecurity has 
become an extremely complex task due to policy contradictions and ideological 
dissension generated by growth-oriented policies and poverty alleviation programmes. 
On the one hand, efforts at market liberalization and structural adjustment that aim for 
faster growth are inevitably accompanied with measures for fiscal tightness and 
shrinkage of public operations. The simultaneous move towards free competitive world 
markets also calls for cuts in support funds that often serve to assist vulnerable groups. 
The subsidy- and support-based approach to food security has become incompatible 
with the present situation. Direct poverty alleviation programmes themselves impose, on 
the other hand, an immense budgetary burden and drain public resources that could be 
used to generate more sustainable growth. Moreover, subsidies and conventional 
poverty programmes command considerable political sensitivity and hence offer little 
flexibility as policy instruments. Administration of poverty programmes is complex and 
cannot avoid leakages or inefficient use of funds. A compromise approach that has 
gained acceptance in the contemporary world is safety-netting for the poor and 
vulnerable through instruments which ensure maximum targeting. Specific targeting, 
facilitated by transparency and participation of the people, can save on costly public 
resources and yet reach the truly needy, such as food-insecure families. 
This paper deals with the solutions adopted by India, a country with a long and diverse 
history of development and poverty alleviation, albeit with varying success. The 
approach to food security evolved through some laudable successes as well as  
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reprehensible failures. In the 1990s, India launched epochal institutional changes and 
embarked on a programme of structural adjustment and globalization. Furthermore, 
India’s political system is struggling to achieve a consensus for eliminating 
poverty-induced food insecurity through approaches and instruments that would be 
consistent with its macroeconomic policies. The finer designs of the programmes as 
well as the institutions that govern their implementation are important for achieving the 
objectives. The paper reviews the experience of India in fighting the poverty and food 
problem, and discusses the changing orientation of strategies towards new and 
innovative methods, also as institutions for rural governance transform. The report 
traces the evolution of the strategy of public works programme (PWP) that now 
promises to be an acceptable instrument for targeting. The strategy is considered for its 
merits and concerns. An empirical study of the rural public works programme in four 
states is conducted, first, to determine whether a linkage exists between a public works 
programme and food insecurity, and second to investigate econometrically whether the 
programme indeed succeeds in seeking out households likely to be food insecure and 
further to highlight who among the food insecure the programme possibly passes over.  
2  India’s approach to food security: a historical sketch 
India emerged from its colonial past of British rule into a multiparty democracy in 1947. 
India, as the second most populous country in the world, incorporates both geographical 
expanse and diversity, often translating into both economic prosperity and 
backwardness among the regions. From a backward economy beset by chronic food 
problems and poverty, India’s road to development started at independence with the 
introduction of the five-year plans. The plans, underscoring regional balance and social 
justice, concentrated initially on industrialization. However, the importance of food for 
the very purpose of pursuing the development plans was gradually appreciated, and food 
issues became an integral part of development as well as an important element in the 
country’s political economy.  
Historically India was a famine-ravaged country. Between 1860 and 1908, there had 
been twenty famines and the Bengal famine of 1943 was a tragedy of diabolical 
magnitude. The construction of railway network in the nineteenth century, attempts by 
the colonial government to stimulate agriculture, and the curbs on speculator hoarding 
after independence helped to ease market shortages and the incidence of localized 
famine. But India as a whole continued to face food shortages even after 1947, and 
inflows from foreign sources, specifically the politically unpopular imports from USA, 
helped to fill the deficit. Physical shortage of food went hand in hand with pervasive 
poverty. 
The ‘grow more food’ campaign of the pre-independence period and a Ford Foundation 
sponsored report ‘India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It’ in 1959 mark the beginning 
of India’s concern over food security. The green revolution that ensued was the 
foremost attempt to combat food insecurity and the dependence on foreign supplies that 
were becoming a disincentive to domestic production. New technology implemented 
with government support as well as training and extension paved the way to a more 
market-oriented and dynamic agriculture. India emerged from its subsistence-oriented 
status, but this progress was confined to specific parts of the country only. India’s plans 
were based on ‘socialistic’ lines that utilized administered pricing, input subsidies and  
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price support to encourage the adoption of technology for the benefit of rural regions 
where the majority of the poor lived. Various market controls supplemented the efforts 
to achieve food security. Technology helped the country reach the target of self-
sufficiency in food production at the national level, but the marginal purchasing power 
of the poverty stricken people limited their economic access to food and its 
marketability. The significance of household-level food security became apparent. The 
universally applicable and broad-based ‘public distribution system’ (PDS) was 
inadequate, given the magnitude of the food-insecurity problem in India. A more 
deliberate and focused strategy was subsequently adopted using different instruments to 
transfer food and income to regions and people in need. It was within this broad 
coverage of a multitude of the so-called poverty eradication programmes that the ‘public 
works programme’ (PWP) evolved to its current form. PWP was not free of the risks of 
failure that have affected many development programmes in India, as is also true for 
similar programmes in other developing countries (Gayi 1995).  
By the end of the 1980s, the food economy of the country came to crossroads. First, the 
green revolution had already offered the coveted self-sufficiency in food at the national 
level and India was no longer a food-shortage country. In fact, the stock of foodgrains 
burgeoned, capturing about half of the government’s huge food subsidy bill. Production 
performance, however, remained uneven across regions and the subsidies went 
disproportionately to the benefit of the surplus regions which more often were not the 
poorest. Second, the excess-producing regions faced problems not only with saturation 
but also ecological issues. Third, in spite of the abundance, scarcity regretfully 
continued to affect disadvantaged regions and deprived population groups, calling for 
improved distribution efforts. Fourth, a severe balance of payment crisis forced India to 
approach the World Bank and as a result, structural adjustment began to shape the 
1990s. This was followed by the India’s membership in the World Trade Organization. 
The resulting programmes were somewhat contrary to India’s own unique economic 
approach. The role of the government in fiscal and monetary management, trade 
promotion and price correction through market facilitation became pronounced. 
Consequently, with the exception of physical infrastructure (mainly roads), public 
investment and expenditure for rural India languished.  
The paradigm shift was not easy. While growth picked up and poverty possibly 
diminished, people faced extra pressure to acquire a certain measure of life quality in 
which social necessities such as education, shelter and health assumed increasing 
importance. Society and the nation now faced greater difficulty in the attempt to move 
on. Rural regions still lagged behind, remaining poverty-prone; regional balance and 
social equality were yet to be attained and pockets of extreme poverty, deprivation, 
starvation and localized famines persisted. Poverty was concentrated among the 
historically underprivileged classes like the tribal population, specific economic groups 
and discriminated social classes. Households disadvantaged by non-productive family 
members found it harder to cope. These households also faced greater vulnerability to 
any food shortage at the national level or price increases triggered by weather conditions 
or exports. Food is an issue of extreme political relevance in India’s multiparty system. 
Policies related to agriculture, poverty and food have caused considerable dissension 
and feature strongly on electoral agendas. The coalition government formed in 2004, 
encompassing a variety of ideologies, emphasizes poverty alleviation, as is outlined in 
their common minimum programme (CMP).   
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2.1 Targeting  assistance  to the food insecure 
In the light of current economic, political and social realities, in order to optimize use of 
limited public funds, the older poverty programmes are being re-designed with the view 
to improve project targeting. While new poverty programmes search for a compromise 
between the growth and distribution-advocates, attempts are being made to target the 
most vulnerable and needy to ensure that their nutritional requirements are satisfied, 
while also meeting India’s other developmental objectives.  
Food is recognized as the basic minimum necessity of life. Given the country’s past 
history of food insecurity, post-independent ruling governments have never tired of 
attempting to devise policies to address insecurity faced by households, by allocating 
substantial budget shares for welfare programmes. But the measures did not always 
attain the desired outcome, because of faulty designs, administrative failures and lack of 
institutions. Instances of starvation deaths, malnutrition and distress suicides never 
disappeared from the media coverage, creating electoral upheavals. Although all 
nutrition-oriented programmes are productive and sustainable in the sense that any 
added nutrition improves the productivity of the recipient, purely welfare-oriented 
schemes are, at best, short-term measures. In the days of liberalization, it is important to 
note that typical welfare- and subsidy-based projects are not market consistent or 
livelihood motivated and have to give way to more sustainable and judicious methods. 
This section briefly describes some targeted but assistance-based programmes, of which 
the oldest and most broad-based effort is the PDS that directly addresses food needs. 
2.2  Institutional changes for rural programmes 
The successful targeting—and efficient operation—of the food-based poverty 
programmes in the Indian rural sector that cover nearly 750 million people depends 
largely on project administration at the grassroots level, as well on the individual’s 
efforts and involvement in his/her own development and welfare. The centralized 
administration system in India entrusted its large bureaucracy with the implementation 
of the programmes. But it was acknowledged all along that the system was inadequate 
for the development of India’s vast rural regions and a more participative system was 
required. Even with the governing bureaucracy in place, a void existed unfortunately in 
rural development area, which largely contributed to the sparing success of the different 
schemes. The decade of the 1990s also saw landmark changes in governance for rural 
development.  
The principle of grassroots governance has existed since independence in spite of 
India’s complex bureaucracy. Efforts towards self-government and decentralization 
(Singh 1999) were advanced through the establishment of the community development 
blocks in 1952, which enabled administration and planning to be carried out at the 
district, block and village levels, as well as through the enactment by some states of the 
Panchayat Raj Act, following Batwant Rai Mehta’s recommendations in 1957. 
Article 40 of the Constitution of India empowered the states to organize the panchayats 
as units of self-government. But over time, enthusiasm declined and ‘decentralization’ 
essentially meant additional layers of bureaucratic controls. The cherished principle of 
grassroot governance embodied in the Panchayati Raj institution (PRI), a three-tier 
substate level government, finally received constitutional recognition with an 
amendment of the constitution only in 1992, and is a landmark episode for the  
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development of food security and poverty alleviation at the household level. This allows 
rural inhabitants, who constitute the vast majority of India’s population, to participate 
directly in their own development efforts, to select projects according to local needs and 
to have voice to air their grievances and problems. Local governments elected by the 
people, now free of the red tape that characterizes centralized governance, and actual 
beneficiaries are able to work in close interaction and to monitor progress as well as the 
utilization of funds. Local governments are encouraged to undertake efforts to mobilize 
resources locally to complement government resources, to identify beneficiaries and to 
involve voluntary agencies for programme implementation. Payments can be made 
transparent through public accountability. 
Almost all states in India elected to adopt the concept of gram sabha (GSs) as well as 
the higher tier government. GSs is a body consisting of persons registered in the 
electoral rolls of a village or a group of villages, which elects a panchayat. In addition 
to the implementation and administration of different poverty programmes, the GSs 
participate in identifying the local poor according to the ‘below poverty line’ criterion. 
The GSs are also concerned with the dissemination of information and simplifying the 
application process. 
After years of bureaucratic administration, the transition to decontrolled governance was 
far from smooth; political bickering and judicial involvement commonly surround the 
process of identifying the beneficiaries, and allegations of political patronage and 
extensive omissions are not uncommon. Governance contradictions between the new 
PRI-based system and the traditional bureaucratic structure continue. Funding for the 
PRI has not been organized. Although the transition to PRI is slow, local level 
governance can certainly help to deal with the problems of household-level poverty and 
food insecurity. 
2.3  The public distribution system in India  
A time-tested instrument in India, the PDS expressly addresses the issue of household 
food security. ‘Rationing’, as it was originally called, has a long history in India, dating 
from the Second World War. Introduced by the British government, the PDS was 
retained after independence as a deliberate social policy. Over time, the PDS, which is 
the largest of its kind in the world, evolved into a national social safety system. It 
became an alternative and parallel market that made foodgrains available at a ‘fair 
price’, thus protecting consumers from high prices generated by the free market 
mechanism. 
The PDS became a component in an integrated foodgrain policy of the government: 
Food Corporation of India (FCI), a public undertaking, conducts foodgrain operations 
on behalf of the government. It procures grains at remunerative prices from farmers, 
sells to vulnerable groups at reasonable prices, and maintains buffer and operational 
stocks. Thus difficulties and inefficiency in FCI’s other operations tend to affect its 
distributional activities adversely. The PDS failed when, in the face of upwardly 
adjusting administered prices, the poor purchasing power of the population masses 
slowed down the offtakes from the public pool, and food security suffered. Yet, this 
process, in conjunction with the existing open-ended procurement policy and a series of 
good harvests, piled up public stocks, causing an unsustainable budgetary burden on the 
government. The PDS was criticized because of its failure to serve the poor, its urban  
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bias, limited coverage within the states with a high concentration of rural poor, and the 
lack of transparent and accountable delivery arrangements. In other words, the broad-
based PDS was perceived as highly untargeted and costly, and there were calls for 
change, including its dismantling to let the open market adjust prices. The FCI reacted 
by pointing out that the PDS was necessary for serving the poor and the remote areas.  
Inevitably, the public distribution system came under the scanner. After the reforms, the 
PDS was redesigned to ensure better coverage in backwards areas. Decentralized 
procurement of grains by state governments or their agencies was introduced in 1997/8, 
and many states opted to adopt the method. PDS was further modified into a two-tiered 
structure known as the ‘targeted public distribution system’ (TPDS) where the 
beneficiaries were identified on the basis of a specific poverty line: (i) households 
existing below the poverty line (BPL households), whose entitlements were subsidized 
and (ii) above-the-poverty-line households (APL) who were allocated foodgrain at cost 
price. This was the new beginning of targeting the PDS.1 To focus the TPDS further, 
Antodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) was launched in 2000 to identify ten million of the 
poorest BPL families covered by the programme for the provision of grains at 
subsidized rates. Prices for the three groups of beneficiaries (APL, BPL and AAY) are 
tied to their economic position, and the system is strictly monitored.2 The PDS also 
supplies grains to other food-based welfare programmes of the government. In addition, 
open sales from public stocks are made to stabilize prices and protect consumers against 
high food prices. Surplus stocks are exported in accordance to WTO regulations. 
Table 1 
 Allocation and takeoffs in PDS (million tons) 
Year 2000/1  2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 
Allocation  27.9 30.4 74.7 71.6 
Offtake  12.0 13.8 20.1 22.8 
Source: GoI  (2003/4).   
Table 2 
Subsidies in Rs millions 
Year BPL  APL  AAY  PDS  OMS  Export  Welfare
2001/2 50,860  4,580  11,310  66,750 6,160  13,680  29,530 
2002/3 63,360  9,240  26,410  99,010 12,060 57,430  13,050 
2003/4 80,050  11,360  28,550  11,960 4,850  36,210  15,510 
Notes:  BPL =   below poverty line; 
  APL =  above poverty line; 
 AAY  =  Antodaya Anna Yojana;  
  PDS =  public distribution system; 
  OMS = open market sales. 
Source: GoI  (2003/4). 
                                                 
1   Initially the BPL entitlement was 10 kg per month per family but was increased as of 2002 to 35 kg 
for both groups. The entitlement for AAY household was 25 kg per family per month, and is now 
same as the APL and BPL entitlements. 
2   Central issue prices (Rs/kg) for rice and wheat are 5.65 and 4.15, respectively, for BPL households; 
8.30 and 6.90 for APL households, and 3 and 2 for AAY recipients.   
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Despite the efforts at fine-tuning, at present the PDS is, at best, a partial solution to food 
insecurity. The subsidy burden is at odds with the economic and fiscal management of 
the economy. Furthermore, the misery of undernutrition that persists even when stocks 
are mounting is an inconsistency that has been described as ‘mass murder’ (Drèze 
2001). The takeoff falls short of the grain allocation (Table 1) because even the BPL 
price set judiciously is not always within the reach of the poor. Also, many households 
mistakenly identified as being ‘above the poverty line’ are too poor to afford the APL 
price. But these inadequacies only serve to add to the stock levels and subsidy burden 
(Tables 3). While discontinuation of the system or even its curtailment is not yet 
politically feasible, the subsidy-based PDS is essentially difficult to manage and 
inconsistent with the times.  
2.4 Assistance targeted towards specific needy sections of the population 
In the current era of structural adjustment and fiscal prudence, the newly evolved 
programmes seek to identify and target specific sections of the society, often even at the 
individual level to address intra-household iniquities. Some schemes also aim to address 
the issue of nutritional requirements in conjunction with other social needs, and come as 
multi-phased packages. Certain programmes have been modified from existing plans 
while others have been adapted from successful schemes in individual states. This 
section will throw light on some of the social assistance schemes, the celebrated 
‘midday meal’ (MDM) scheme and the programme called ICDS. 
A number of financial assistance schemes, collectively known as ‘national social 
assistance programmes’ (NSAPs), were launched in 1995/6. To meet the constitutional 
commitment towards poor households, the NSAPs seek to provide a minimum 
assurance to those in need or disabled by old age, death of breadwinner and maternity 
(see Appendix  A1). The NSAPs encompass the national old age pension scheme 
(NOAPS), the national family benefit scheme (NFBS), and the national maternity 
benefit scheme (NMBS). Annapurna is a scheme started in 2000, addressing the food 
security of senior citizens, providing free food to specific old-aged groups. Community 
grain banks, built with a participatory approach, focus on remote tribal-dominated areas 
for the prevention of starvation deaths, while the wheat-based nutrition programme is 
catered to adolescent girls; women’s hostels for backward classes serve the traditionally 
neglected gender. The national nutrition mission, launched in 2001, provides subsidized 
foodgrains to adolescent girls and expecting and lactating mothers. 
The national programme for nutritional support to primary education, or the MDM as it 
is popularly known, draws on the successful experience of Tamil Nadu. Initiated in all 
government and government-aided schools, MDM provides either cooked lunches or 
foodgrains to assure food security without caste or gender bias. Its goal is to eliminate 
classroom hunger and promote balanced socialization along with free and compulsory 
education to all children. This goal is as old as the Indian Constitution but received 
added attention in the 1990s.3 The MDM has been successful in significantly increasing 
school enrolment, improving attendance and keeping students in school. It has been 
                                                 
3   Supreme Court (the Unnikrishnan Case 1993), on examining constitutional provisions, declared basic 
education as a fundamental right. Following this, a bill is currently under consideration to incorporate 
education for children to the age of 14 years as a fundamental right. Primary education has also gained 
importance all over the world, especially with structural adjustment.  
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especially beneficial to girls who have been discriminated into leaving school 
prematurely. Conjunctively, the choice of cooks (preferably women) from the lower 
caste (Dalit) and the construction of cooking sheds have helped to further increase 
employment and income among the specially-targeted socially weaker castes and 
gender.  
Started in 1975, the integrated child development services programme (ICDS) is one of 
the most unique, community-based outreach programmes in the world for early 
childhood care and attention to pregnant and lactating women. The Anganwadi centre 
has become a symbol of the government system providing services to disadvantaged 
communities at the village/hamlet level. ICDS contributes to the achievement of its 
goals related not only to nutrition but also health and early child development, primary 
health care and universal elementary education.  
Table 3 





MDM (midday meal)   8.2  4.3 
Hostel (SC/ST/OBC)  2.7  0.5 
Annapurna (national maternity benefit scheme)  0.4  0.2 
Total 37.9  25.0 
Source:   GoI (2003/4). 
2.5  Poverty programmes and the evolution of public works 
Public works constitute a tool for conferring purchasing power or direct nutrition to the 
chosen beneficiary groups. Like the PDS, it offers an alternative market, but in this case 
the target group comprise job seekers and provide a floor for market wages at a 
reasonable level. On the other hand, unlike PDS it need not entail patent subsidies since 
payment is made against productive work through which useful assts can be created. If 
implemented optimally, it is more in the nature of investment. In fact, it can be 
construed as part of the national public investment programmes which are neither new 
nor exclusive to India. Historically, in the face of natural distress, ‘relief’ work has been 
used since ancient times as the means of creating income and employment. Many 
developed and developing countries have at various times used relief work during 
difficult periods. However, over the past decades, rural employment has been used in 
the developing world on a regular basis for poverty alleviation. 
While most poverty programmes address the needs and weaknesses of specific 
population groups which cannot be corrected by society and market, the ‘public works 
programme’ (PWP) considers the lack of work as the single most important cause of 
poverty among households. When the free market fails to provide livelihood 
opportunities to the poor, particularly the unskilled, the state steps in to correct the 
anomaly. In particular, women get a poor deal in agricultural labour market. Manual, 
repetitive, arduous and even injurious jobs are assigned to them along with 
discriminatingly poor pay (Kaur 1996). By creating an alternative and well designed job 
market, PWP can improve women’s bargaining power. Furthermore, PWP also leads to 
the creation of important rural amenities and the provision of necessary services. Thus 
PWPs are productivity enhancing. Housing, approach roads and bridges as well as  
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schoolbuildings add to rural physical and social infrastructure. The construction of wells 
and restoration of tanks, soil conservation and improvement of the watershed are 
services that directly impact on agriculture. The poorest population sections benefit 
from the development and maintenance of common property resources. Thus, the poor 
and the jobless are, on the one hand, assured of a minimum income through the PWP, 
while on the other hand, important public goods that the government needs to provide 
are created. The two-pronged approach has potential for long-term sustainability since 
productivity is increased in the process. Above all, the PWP—unlike most anti-poverty 
measures—is not in the nature of assistance. Rather, it is a job market, in which needy 
households can participate voluntarily and with dignity for a minimum income to satisfy 
basic needs. The PWP is also a politically recognized minimum safety-net to the rural 
poor (Hiraway 1994). 
Thus by providing a fair and just job market, the PWP can improve the bargaining 
strength of the poor in the traditional labourmarket, reduce job discrimination by 
gender, caste or religion, balance seasonal income fluctuation and increase wage levels. 
PWPs, in the nature of food-for-work (FFW) projects, implemented in various less-
developed countries, pay wages directly in kind, thus addressing the minimum 
nutritional needs of the people and reducing misappropriation of funds. In India, this 
programme has made use of favourable harvests. In addition, distribution of foodstocks 
from surplus domestic production serves to promote the disposal of public stocks. 
One of most important advantages of the PWP is that it can be designed to be self-
targeting. Identifying the poor presents a daunting challenge in most poverty 
programmes and results in profligate use of scarce public resources, whereas the PWP, 
through the type of work and wage rates offered, can be used as instruments to attract 
the truly needy and to discourage the less deserving. For its target selection, the PWP 
need not rely on some arbitrary identification of the poor that may not always be 
accurate or exhaustive. But this can also become a disadvantage if the project is not 
effectively designed and implemented. If the work or conditions become too arduous, 
unpleasant, gender predisposed or logistically inconvenient, the PWP may in fact 
discourage the truly needy, given their specific socioeconomic characteristics, and thus 
become self-defeating. Faulty administration can enable people with more influence to 
find devious ways of cornering the benefits while the poor prefer to stay away. The test 
of the programme lies in its ability to focus only on the truly needy (Ravallion 1990). 
The history of public works in India is dotted with programmes more diverse in their 
name than in content, and these received greater notice in political importance than in 
implementation record. The ‘rural works programme’, first initiated in 1970/1, was later 
re-designated as the ‘drought prone area programme’ (DPAP). The ‘food-for-work 
programme’ was started in 1977 with the aim of utilizing the surplus food stocks of the 
times. The ‘national rural employment programme’ (NREP) evolved in 1980. The ‘rural 
landless employment guarantee programme’ (RLEGP) was instituted in 1983 to address 
the plight of the core rural poor. In 1989 NREP and RLEGP were merged to form the 
Jawahar Rozhar Yojana (JRY) that prioritized backward, schedule caste and schedule 
tribe classes (SC/ST), women and bonded labour. Central and state governments shared 
the expenses, and wages were paid partly in cash and partly in food. Labour-intensive 
projects were preferred and operationalized by stipulating a desired wage-to-material 
cost ratio. In 1993 the JRY was again modified, and two of its components made 
independent. These separate programmes—the ‘million wells’ and Indira Awaas Yojana 
for rural housing—also promoted rural employment. JRY was redesigned again in  
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2000/1, and converted into Jawahar Gram Samriddhi Yojana. The ‘employment 
assurance scheme’ was set up in 1993 in districts covered by the modified PDS to 
provide 100 days of unskilled manual labour to the rural poor who want it. This is a 
typical rural works programme with the primary objective of providing wage 
employment and with the secondary aim of creating social and economic assets in rural 
areas for a sustainable community. The three tiers of the panchayat also share in the 
implementation and allotment of funds and foodgrain.  
In November 2004 the newly elected coalition government launched the ‘food-for-
work’ programme, based on rozgar badhao (increase incomes), the slogan of the time. 
The option of productive employment guaranteed by the state gained added importance 
when it was noted that the employment elasticity of output was declining in the post-
reform period and employment growth was falling despite the country’s impressive 
economic improvement (Sen and Jha 2005). Wage employment campaigns like the 
‘employment guarantee scheme’, Jawahar Rojgar Yojana and ‘employment assurance 
scheme’ were noted to be more pro-poor than programmes like the ‘integrated rural 
development programme’ (self-employment programme) and the ‘public distribution 
system’. An employment scheme already functional in the state of Maharashtra was 
acclaimed by both international and national critics of varied ideologies. The PWP is 
increasingly being considered as the solution in fighting the deepest levels of poverty. A 
milestone in the efforts of awarding to the poor the political right to employment is the 
legal recognition now extended to this issue. According to a new Bill (Appendix A1) 
the existing FFW will be replaced with the ‘national rural employment guarantee’ 
(NREG), and the government is obligated to provide a minimum of public  works 
employment opportunities to anyone seeking it. Under consideration is a constructive 
plan to integrate the NREG with the country’s various infrastructure programmes 
relating to roads and irrigation. On the other hand, there is some apprehension that a 
nationwide public-works programme could be impracticable because of (i) the huge 
budgetary burden it imposes and (ii) the difficulty of implementing it efficiently. While 
the performance of a nationwide programme can best be evaluated over time, India’s 
existing schemes can be assessed to determine how far the PWPs were capable of 
attracting the targeted sections of the society for public ministration. The following 
section conducts an empirical study of the PWPs in four medium ranking states in India 
and looks for the association between household food insecurity and participation in 
PWP. 
3  Empirical study  
Ideally, a targeted PWP should reach the needy households—and only the needy. As 
food is one of the basic needs of a household, this study attempts to examine the linkage 
between PWP and food security. Such a task is, however, difficult because of (i) the 
definitional ambiguities of the concept of food insecurity and (ii) the economic and 
political impossibility of identifying all qualifying individuals. Constructing a suitable 
specification for food security at the household level academically circumvents the first 
hurdle. The second difficulty is often dealt with in real life applications by a political 
and administrative process through which the self-declared needy households are 
evaluated according to a cutoff income level, called the poverty line. The process is 
complex and leads to political patronage, judicial conflicts and delays. More often than 
not, it leaves out many deserving cases. A more commonly used approach in India’s  
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development history is to identify the socioeconomic characteristics associated with the 
problem and to direct expenditure towards the regions, castes and groups considered to 
be disadvantaged. PWP itself is likely to be self-targeting towards the needy, provided 
that it is properly designed. An assessment of PWP’s efficiency in addressing the basic 
requirement of food security can, however, be made by analysing the food security 
situation of beneficiary households, although PWP participation itself affects the 
household’s food security status. Essentially, if properly designed and functioning, the 
PWP would focus on such socioeconomic conditions that are also likely to be associated 
with food insecurity. 
Assessment of the PWPs can therefore be made through the following steps: 
(i)  constructing a reasonable specification and threshold for food security; 
(ii) identifying the factors associated with food-insecure households; (iii) highlighting 
the factors associated with PWP participation and matching these to food-insecure 
households, and (iv)  identifying factors that ‘overlook’ or even discourage food-
insecure households from participating. 
3.1  Data and area of work 
The study is based on unit-level observations from the 55th round of quinquennial 
survey (1999/2000) of the National Sample Survey Organization of India (NSSO). The 
study covers the rural population of four states: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, West 
Bengal and Orissa. In view of the fact that the issues under consideration are basic food 
insecurity and public works, both of which are relevant factors for the less skilled and 
uninformed population sectors, the study concentrates only on households headed by 
individuals with no education. As observed in Appendix Table  A4, this group 
constitutes the largest section of rural households, excluding less than 2 per cent of 
households in most cases. 
The NSSO provides information at the household level and member level on various 
socioeconomic attributes. Since consumption information is mostly provided at the 
household level, the household is taken as the unit of study for the main purpose of the 
report. However, member-level information on age and gender composition of 
households and education of the head of household is obtained from member files and 
merged with the household database used for the analysis. The household file provides 
data on PWP participation. 
Information on household-level socioeconomic characteristics relevant for the study is 
collected as possible from the NSSO database. These attributes are mostly described by 
categorical variables with only limited and discrete values. Since geographical 
advantage plays an important part in the development of a state and wellbeing of the 
people, the location of the household is needed. In this case, the states are divided into 
different regions according to agro-climatic conditions and other considerations 
provided by NSSO. It is recognized that even when India prospers at the macrolevel, 
people in drought prone or arid regions bear hardship and malnutrition. However, 
intervention and prioritization by the state endeavour to level out geographical 
advantages and disadvantages among the states, as balanced regional development is 
one of the objectives of the state machinery. Since regional imbalances still exist and the 
PWP is a part of state policy, geographical divergence is taken into account.   
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Occupation is generally associated with economic conditions, and poverty has been 
concentrated among certain households, such as agricultural labourers. The NSSO 
classification of households by ‘household type’ according to main income source is 
also applied here to categorize households by occupation. Certain social classes are 
often marginalized due to historical reasons, prejudice or the inevitable majority 
dominance. Thus, apart from India’s main religion Hinduism, other religious groups at 
times are neglected, although these may in certain communities even surpass Hindus 
with regard to progressiveness and prosperity. The largest minority group in India are 
the Muslims. The caste system is a wellknown complexity of the Indian society and 
throughout the ages, minority castes and tribes have been deprived of development 
approach. Scheduled castes and tribes in India are currently protected by the 
constitution, with a quota in government jobs and special poverty programmes but even 
now inequality persists. Recently, certain other backward classes (OBCs) have been 
singled out for special attention, and NSSO reports these households separately as such.  
Characteristics of the family members of a household are also important. The household 
size, measuring the number of members to feed, is an important determinant of its 
wellbeing and earning power. Family size can also constitute a liability with regard to 
food consumption, and its composition has an impact. The presence of children in the 
family creates other demands in addition to food, making a household more vulnerable 
to food insecurity but less qualified in terms of earning capacity and heavy work. 
Similarly, female members are at times disadvantaged in the labour market; they are 
constrained by the nature and condition of the work available, domestic commitments 
and safety-related issues. The household size and composition variables, measuring the 
proportion of children and female adults, respectively, are continuous variables. 
Education confers information, as well as additional power in the labour market. It also 
influences consumption decisions and diet awareness. The educational level of the 
household head is taken to characterize this variable. Admittedly, this variable has its 
limitation, considering that in some cases, the household head may not be the main 
source of household finances or awareness. This, however, is not likely for the majority 
of cases. Based on the assumption that headship implies financial and decisionmaking 
power, this characterization of the household is retained. Education is taken as a 
categorical variable, using the NSSO’s classification of educational attainment. 
3.2  Categorization and characterization of households 
Regions: Andhra Pradesh (coastal, inland north, southwestern, inland south); Madhya 
Pradesh (Chhattisgarh, Vindhya central, Malwa, south, southwestern, north); 
Orissa (coastal, south, north) and West Bengal (Himalayan, eastern plains, 
central plains, western plains). 
Household types: Self-employed in non-agriculture; agricultural labourer; other labour; 
self-employed agricultural worker; others. 
Education of household head: Illiterate, non-formal education (literate by attending non-
formal schools) and literate but less than primary school; primary school; middle 
school; secondary/higher secondary schooling; graduate and above. 
Religion: Majority (Hindu); minority (Muslim); others.  
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Caste: backward, schedule caste and schedule tribes (SC/ST); other backward classes 
(OBCs); non-backward; general 
Household features: Household size; proportion of children; proportion of females. 
3.3  The selected states: an overview 
The four states selected for the study do not represent the leading states of India in terms 
of major indicators. All the states have a gross domestic product (GDP) below national 
average. West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh are middle-ranking states in India both in 
terms of GDP and human development index (HDI) while Madhya Pradesh and Orissa 
are lower ranking. The poverty headcount ratio is high in all the states except Andhra. 
However according to the Planning Commission, the poverty rate in West Bengal came 
down significantly in 1999, and it is one of the fastest growing states of recent times. 
But West Bengal is also experiencing slow growth in employment generation, a 
reflection of its dense population, large share of minority (SC/ST/Muslim) population 
and concentration of rural poverty. The eastern states West Bengal and Orissa are 
deficient in electricity infrastructure, while all the states under study have a limited 
supply of drinking water. Andhra, Orissa and West Bengal encompass coastal belts with 
superior soil fertility, but are prone to cyclones and floods. Madhya Pradesh is inland 
bound but richly endowed in minerals. Forest coverage is the greatest in Madhya 
Pradesh and Orissa, while West Bengal has the least. The former states also have 
highest ratio of tribal populations, nearly 30 per cent. Orissa is vulnerable to disasters 
affecting human lives and food availability. Madhya Pradesh has a higher per capita 
production of cereals than the India average and is the only one among the four states to 
record a surplus, the others being net consumers. 
The Food Insecurity Atlas of Rural India,  published by the Swaminathan Research 
Foundation, gives a fairly complete picture of India’s performance and difficulties in 
each state. In all the selected states, the average per capita consumption of cereal 
exceeds the norm of the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) while that of other 
foods falls far short. In fact, the ratio of cereal consumption to norm is higher than the 
all-India average (Table 4), a fact which qualifies these states as dominantly cereal 
consuming. Cereals still seem to be the main dietary item and chief source of energy. It 
may not, however, be inappropriate to consider cereal intake relative to norm as an  
 
Table 4 













Cereals  1.05 1.13 1.26 1.19 1.04  420 
Cereal substitutes  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05  75 
Pulses 0.58  0.81  0.38 0.35 0.58  40 
Vegetables 0.53  0.45 0.47 0.51 0.48  125 
Fruit  0.45 0.21 0.27 0.38 0.45  50 
Milk and milk products  0.52 0.55 0.15 0.31 0.97  150 
Oils 0.56  0.45  0.27 0.52 0.52  22 
Meat 0.29  0.08  0.08 0.17 0.15  25 
Fish 0.15  0.08  0.39 0.72 0.28  25 
Source:  Swaminathan Research Foundation (2001).  
14 
Table 5 





Pradesh  Orissa 
West 
Bengal  India 
Cereal consumption per month per capita:         
Quantity (Kg)  12.65  12.94 15.09 13.59 12.72 
Value (Rs)  111.7  100.29 134.38 142.76 107.75 
Calorie intake per diem (kcal) (a  2021 2062 2119 2095 2149 
Insufficient food (%) (b  1.9 3.1  8  10.6 3.3 
Monthly per capita consumption 
expenditure (based on 30-day  
recall) (Rs) 
453 401 373 454 486 
 Notes:  (a  Calorie intake per diem. ‘Norm’ is 2,700 kcal per consumer unit per diem (from all sources); 
  (b  Insufficient food relates to people who did not get enough food for at least one calendar 
month within the year. 
Source:  Cited in Deaton (2001). 
indicator of food insecurity. The average cereal consumption in Orissa at 531 grams per 
day is the highest among the states and is well above ICMR norm. Yet, as observed, 
Orissa ranks low in terms of GDP and poverty. On the other hand, Orissa suffers from 
seasonal food inadequacy and ranks first in the share of people (15.4) who report not 
having two ‘decent’ meals a day for at least a part of the year. It records low 
consumption ratios relative to other states for all items other than cereals and fish (large 
sections of the Indian population do not eat fish because of limitations imposed by 
geography or custom; the east is an exception), indicating that in Orissa a higher 
standard consumption basket is lacking. Madhya Pradesh has fairly high ratios with 
respect to cereals and pulses. Per capita calorie intake falls short of ICMR norm and 
all-India average. 
3.4 Food  insecurity  indicators 
The difficulty of measuring food adequacy has been widely recognized. The NSSO of 
India collects information on household consumption of food and other items possibly 
in one of the largest and best-designed survey in India. Food security questions are 
usually examined with an analysis of the NSSO survey data. To facilitate understanding 
the problem, the NSSO broadened its scope of query. As the data on item-wise food 
consumption are reported as values or, in some cases, as quantity, as well as in the 
equivalent calorie intake, questions pertaining to meal adequacy were added. The 
various specifications for meal adequacy—namely, no meals, number of meals and 
whether two decent meals4 were available in a day—result from different recall periods 
and have produced conflicting conclusions. In fact, the zero-meal criterion indicates that 
there is little instance of food insecurity in India. The calorie question raises several 
conceptual contradictions. The calorie, a unit of energy, has always been considered as 
                                                 
4   Recall periods are, respectively, the day of survey for zero meals, the number of meals over 30 days 
and number of two decent daily meals over one year.  
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the main measure of food adequacy and is the basis of poverty measurement in India.5 
What calorie level can be considered adequate for a healthy life? The answer is not 
clear. The government of India, in setting the poverty line, applied a norm based on the 
ICMR recommendation of 2,400 kcal per consumer unit for rural India. FAO, on the 
other hand, fixed a minimum requirement of 1,890 kcal for a typical citizen in India. 
Actual calorific requirements depend on factors such as gender, age, body-weight and 
nature of work, all of which vary among individuals. Fixing a norm, therefore, requires 
a detailed analysis of the population being studied.  
Consumption of cereals is a possible indicator of food adequacy, as they are the basic 
ingredient of the Indian diet and provide the highest energy share (about 71 per cent), of 
all eaten foods. Lately, however, with higher incomes and improved knowledge of 
nutrition, the consumption patterns in India have shifted from cereals to milk products, 
fleshy food and fruit (Radhakrishna 1992). In many states, the average cereal 
consumption has dropped to less than the ICMR norm and is generally compensated by 
other foods. But for the large majority of the rural population having low incomes and 
limited information, the substitution may not be significant and cereals continue to be 
the main dietary ingredient. The low consumption of cereals in rural India is of concern 
in the cases where no improvement in the consumption of other foods is obvious. 
In fact, this study finds that according to statistical correlation computed across 
households (Table 6), consumption levels of most foods are complementary to cereal 
consumption in the states concerned. Only in Andhra Pradesh do cereal-substitutes seem 
to replace cereals. Pulses are the chief source of protein for most people in India, 
particularly the poor, and these show a high correlation, especially in Orissa. Milk and 
milk products and vegetables, the other two possible dietary diversifications, show a 
clear positive relation with cereal intake and so do edible food oils. As the data for the 
states under examination failed to affirm any credible sign of substitution and as no 
single indicator is without its conceptual limitations, cereals can still be taken as the 
primary and indicative source of household food and nutrition security. 
 
Table 6 
Correlation (Spearman’s) between household consumption of cereals with other foods 
Food  Andhra Pradesh Madhya Pradesh West Bengal  Orissa 
Cereal  substitutes  -0.330** 0.023** 0.115** 0.147** 
Pulses and products  0.125** 0.379** 0.413** 0.536** 
Milk and products  0.395** 0.324** 0.297** 0.338* 
Edible  oils  0.541** 0.311** 0.379** 0.517** 
Eggs, fish, meat  0.418** 0.282** 0.480** 0.510** 
Vegetables 0.388**  0.272** 0.442** 0.653** 
Fruit  0.248** 0.231** 0.177** 0.398** 
Note:  ** Significant at 0.05 level (two tailed). 
Source:  Computed based on NSSO data.   
                                                 
5  There are other important necessary nutrients but when the calorie intake is low, determining the use 
of proper proteins is not possible and nutritional assessment is made by treating calories as the single 
largest item (Sengupta and Joshi 1978).  
16 
Table 7 







Bengal  Orissa 
Household size, mean persons  4.4 5.6 5.2  4.9 
Consumption expenditure, mean per capita per  
month (Rs) 
448.0 396.0 447.0  370.5 
Cereal consumption, mean per capita per month (kg) 12.8 12.9 13.6  15.2 
FINSEC1, food-insecure people  (%)  52.5 52.4 44.3  23.8 
FINSEC2, food-insecure people  (%)  26.6 41.4 25.5  48.1 
Source:  Computed based on NSSO data.  
 
Table 8 
Monthly per capita expenditure in Rs (MPCE) and household size (HSZ) 
according to food-security status of households 
    Andhra Pradesh    Madhya Pradesh   West Bengal    Orissa 
Region   Insecure  Secure    Insecure Secure  Insecure Secure  Insecure  Secure
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Note:  Food insecurity measure = FINSEC1. 
Source:  Computed based on NSSO data.   
 
Table 9  
Ranking of regions according to food insecurity 
  Andhra Pradesh    Madhya Pradesh  West Bengal  Orissa 
Rank FINSEC1  FINSEC2    FINSEC1 FINSEC2 FINSEC1 FINSEC2 FINSEC1 FINSEC2
1  2 4    6 5  2  4   2 2 
2  3 3    4 1  3  2   3 3 
3  4 2    3 6  4  1   1 1 
4  1 1    5 3  1  3      
5      7  2         
6      1  4         
7      2  7         
Source:  Computed based on NSSO data. 
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We assume cereal consumption to be a reasonable reflection of the food security of rural 
households. Therefore, food insecurity is primarily proxied here by the indicator 
FINSEC1 which considers a shortfall in cereal consumption from the ICMR norm, 
taken to be the base. Thus, households with consumption below the norm are deemed to 
be food insecure while others are food secure. This measure presupposes a threshold 
ascertained by an apex agency on the basis of scientific methodology. An alternative 
index, FINSEC2, is also considered for comparison. The second indicator indirectly 
applies the calorie norm, essentially utilizing the official poverty line which corresponds 
to the minimum expenditure needed to meet calorie requirements as well as certain 
basic essentials of life. In this sense, a household is considered food insecure in 
FINSEC2 if it falls below the poverty line.6  
The two methods of conceptualization have important differences. FINSEC1 assesses 
deepest deprivation, according to which the issue is the consumption of the basic 
minimum energy requirement needed for sustaining life. But it also recognizes the need 
for other basic items, household preferences and the urge to fulfil them. Indicator 
FINSEC2 effectively allows for substitution among alternative consumption items 
within limited means, but is blind to their actual allocation. In other words, a household 
considered by FINSEC2 to be food secure may, in fact, allocate most of its expenditure 
to other family-preferred needs and thus be undernourished. The relation between the 
two indicators is not straightforward. Normally, it would seem that households 
considered as food insecure by the first indicator are a subset of those indicated by the 
second. However this is not always true, as can be seen in Table 7 where the extent of 
insecurity according to FINSEC1 exceeds, in some cases, the insecurity as measured by 
FINSEC2. Poorest households, verging on destitution and habitually deprived of many 
other essentials for life quality, are likely to prioritize the most basic need, food, over 
shelter, education and health. In addition, they may have access to cereals, even if of 
inferior quality such as that obtained by begging or from charity organizations. A less 
poor household will possibly have constraints on potential sources of income or food, 
and often other needs in their expenditure decisions such as children’s education and 
health take primacy over food.  
The monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) for the sample households in the four 
states under review is the lowest in Orissa (Table 5) although according to the first 
criteria, the proportion of food-insecure people in the state is the smallest, but the 
highest by the second criterion (Appendix Table A4). Based on the two criteria, the 
ranking of the regions within the states (Table 9) also vary, except for Orissa. Here, the 
southern region—constituting the districts of Phulbani, Koraput and Kalahandi—stands 
out as the most food insecure while the coastal region is the least. In Andhra, too, the 
coastal region is the most food secure and based on the two indicators first place is 
taken by the two inland regions, respectively. For Madhya Pradesh, the rankings are 
different and the southern and southwestern regions lead in food insecurity with 
FINSEC2 and FINSEC1, respectively. 
Perhaps one can conjecture that the high (above 50 per cent) proportion of food-insecure 
households in Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh within FINSEC1 corresponds to 
more affluent groups who prefer to substitute higher value foods for cereals. Although 
                                                 
6  Demographic corrections for household composition are not attempted separately but the norms have 
an inbuilt correction that corresponds to Indian population character.  
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this possibility cannot be ruled out, Table 8 consistently shows that the food-secure 
group according to FINSEC1 has, on average, a higher MPCE than the corresponding 
food-insecure group. This holds for all the states analysed and all regions within them. 
The possibility of dietary diversification associated with higher income is thus not 
apparent for the designated food-insecure group. Measures of association (contingency 
coefficient and Kendal’s tau-C) calculated for the sample households in Appendix 
Table 5A also suggest a moderately positive association between food security for the 
two measures essentially based on cereal intake and MPCE, respectively. 
Food markets are usually considered to constitute fairly perfect markets, and households 
are often the pricetakers subject to locally prevalent prices. Thus, the sources for 
households accessing food and the quality of consumed food are not always consistent, 
and the expenditure needed for the same amount of food can differ. In essence, 
households pay diverging prices and these can be imputed for cereals from the NSSO 
data that provide statistics on both expenditures and quantity. The MPCE, taken as a 
proxy for income, and the paid price both convey information on a household’s access 
to food (Table 10). Food-insecure households pay marginally less for food than food-
secure families except in West Bengal, but the differences are very small. On the whole, 
imputed prices show modest variation across households. Economic access is 
substantially higher for the food-secure in all states; variations are also larger. 
Table 10 





Pradesh   West Bengal  Orissa 
Imputed price (Rs/kg)         
Food insecure  8.67  7.7  10.8  8.7 
Food secure  8.88  7.9  10.5  8.9 
Economic access (kg)         
Food insecure  45.57  47.7  35.15  33.3 
Food secure  57.6  59.4  48.68  44.5 
Notes:  Food insecurity measure = FINSEC1; 
  Economic access is MPCE divided by imputed price; 
  Coefficients of variations across both households are, respectively, for the four states: 
  (i) Imputed price: 0.21, 0.23, 0.17, 0.17; 
  (ii) Economic access: 0.45, 0.55, 0.76, 0.46. 
Source:  Computed based on NSSO data.   
3.4  Food insecurity and public works 
Food insecurity is an extreme deprivation, but it is just one facet of poverty. Food is a 
basic need, but other competing needs exist and they are prioritized according to the 
preferences of the household within its own specific circumstances. Consumption 
decisions on different goods are driven by a household’s prioritization of its 
requirements, demonstrations and their relation in the labour market. The labour market, 
as is commonly recognized, does not treat all individuals equally. Households with 
more dependent than productive members are at a disadvantage. The labour market may 
discriminate against women, as well as against certain sections of the society who may 
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already be historically less privileged. In general, the design and implementation of 
PWP as well as specific socio-cultural attitudes in the states combine to determine who 
participate and who do not. 
Public works (PWPs) constitute a special segment of the labour market. Although these 
programmes should be free of the iniquities of open market, it is hard to imagine a PWP 
without defects. Depending on the power structure and the efficiency of the state 
administration, discrimination has not spared the PWP. Furthermore, the difficulties of 
taking advantage of the employment opportunities, coupled with the nature of work 
offered and its income prospects, may discourage the truly needy households for whom 
the PWPs are intended. Frequently, the social stigma of a safety-net programme can also 
deter certain sections of the poor, but the ultimate decision of whether or not to 
participate depends on the importance a household places on its various needs.  
A household is deemed to be participating in a public works programme if at least one 
member has been employed for at least 60 days through a PWP over the last 365 days. It 
is not an easy task to examine the relationship between participation and food 
insecurity, or for that matter, between MPCE and food insecurity. Neither is it simple to 
answer the questions: (i) is food insecurity eased by PWP participation?, or (ii) is 
participation motivated by food insecurity? These are fraught with complex causality 
and any econometric attempt in this direction is usually hindered by problems of 
endogeneity. However, as Table 11 shows, in the states under study, PWP covers a 
significantly small share of the food-insecure population, and that households 
considered as food secure also participate. In line with earlier findings, this suggests that 
even households not considered as income poor by the conventionally drawn poverty 
line are often food insecure, and apparently food is not the only factor motivating 
participation. However important the option of food for sustaining life, a household’s 
perception of its basic wants within today’s contemporary world ultimately determines 
its consumption and earning decisions. Despite this dilution, participation and food 
insecurity are statistically found to be mutually associated in a positive and significant 
way, as is reported in Appendix Table A5. 
Table 11 
Percentage of households participating in public works programmes, according to food-security status 
    Andhra Pradesh   Madhya Pradesh   West Bengal    Orissa 
Region   Insecure  Secure   Insecure Secure  Insecure Secure   Insecure  Secure
1    1.3 2.3  4.2 1.8 0.7  4.0 1.8  2.4 
2    1.4 1.4  3.7 2.8 2.2  1.3 6.8  7.0 
3   0.8  0.1  0  0.9  1.6 1.0  5.8 3.5 
4   0.4  3.0  2.7  4.8 8.9  2.7     
5       3.7  2.9       
6       5.0  2.4       
7       5.7  4.2       
Note:   Food insecurity measure = FINSEC1. 




Characteristics of households likely to be food insecure (according to FINSEC1) and to participate in public works programmes  
  Andhra Pradesh  Madhya Pradesh  Orissa  West Bengal 
  Food insecure  PWP participation  Food insecure  PWP participation  Food insecure  PWP participation  Food insecure  PWP participation 
Most likely  − Inland North 
− Southwest 
− Coastal 
− Inland South 








  − Eastern plains 
− Central plains 
− Western plains 
Himalayans 
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− Other labour 
− Self-employed 
agricultural worker 
− Other labour 
  − Others  
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− Other labour 
− Other labour 
− Agricultural labour 
  − Others 
− Other labour 
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Most likely  − More children  
− More female 
members 
− Large sized 
household 
− Fewer female 
members  
− Fewer children 
− Small sized 
household 
  − More children  
− Fewer female 
members 
− Large sized 
household 
− More children  
− More female 
members 
− Small sized 
household 
  − More children  
− Fewer female 
members 
− Large sized 
household 
− Fewer children 
− Fewer female 
members 
− Large sized 
household 
  − More children  
− More female 
members 
− Large sized 
household  
− Fewer children 
Fewer female 
members 
− Large sized 
household 
    




  SEC/HS/illiterate  No formal education/ 
primary school 
  Primary or middle 
school 
No formal education/ 
SEC/HS 
 
  No formal education: 
illiterate 
Illiterate, or middle 
school education 
Least likely  Illiterate  Primary school    Primary  school  SEC/HS   SEC/HS  Primary school    SEC/HS  Primary school 
Most likely  Hindu, Muslim  Others, Hindu    Muslim, Hindu  Others, Hindu    Muslim, Hindu  Others, Hindu    Others, Muslim  Others, Hindu 
Least  likely  Others Muslim   Others Muslim   Others Muslim   Hindu  Muslim 
Most likely  OBC general  SC/ST OBC    OBC SC/ST  SC/ST OBC   SC/ST  OBC SC/ST  OBC   General  OBC  OBC  General 
Least  likely  SC/ST  General   General General   General General   SC/ST  SC/ST 





4 Modelling  approach 
The exercise attempts to study the diverging impact of certain important socioeconomic 
factors that are exogenous to the decisionmaking process in choosing between the two 
different scenarios, i.e., whether a household opts to remain food insecure or participate 
in a PWP, respectively. Given the nature of the data and the specifications in this study, 
both scenarios can be modelled as categorical variables. Based on discrete choice 
models of qualitative variables, in a non-coercive system both options can be 
characterized as binary choice variables (i.e., a household chooses to be or not to be 
food insecure, or a household chooses to participate or not to participate), given the 
rational household’s individual circumstances. The rationale for the model can be drawn 
from MacFadden’s random utility class of model according to which households choose 
the option if the corresponding net benefit N is positive. Correspondingly, a dummy 
dependent variable Y is defined so that Y = 1 if the household chooses the option, Y = 0 
otherwise. 
The probability of the event P = Prob(Y=1) is described by a logistic function and the 
odds are derived as: 
P/(1-P) = exp(β´X) 
where X is a vector of attribute variables describing the household and β is a vector of 
parameters bj, showing direction of the relation, the value of β itself being hard to 
interpret. Exp(b) are presented in Appendix Table A6 indicative of the factor of change 
on the odds due to unit change in explanatory variables. Thus Exp(bj) =1 signifies that a 
household’s decision, i.e., the odds that the household selects the event, is unaffected by 
a change in variable Xi.  
Binary logistic models are estimated using socioeconomic and household features as 
exogenous variables, and ‘food insecurity’ and ‘participation’ as options to be 
explained. The two equations for ‘food insecurity’ are estimated using the two 
specifications FINSEC1 and FINSEC2. For ‘participation’, two equations are also 
estimated: one uncontrolled and the other controlled for food insecurity. The results of 
the binary logistic model (see Appendix Table A4) for food insecurity and participation 
are presented in the Appendix Tables A6 and A7. The essential propose of the model is 
to identify for a comparison the factors associated with the two different events. 
The dependent variable takes discrete values indicating the household choice. The 
exogenous variables are, in most cases, also discrete and the model can help to identify 
the categories for each possible attribute of the two different options in varying degrees 
of likelihood. The categories can then be matched for similarity to determine whether 
the same categories that lead to food insecurity also induce participation. In Table 12 the 
two categories associated with the maximum likelihood of the options and one category 
with the least likelihood are compared. In the case of household features that are 
continuous variables, direction of the relationship is marked in each case. 
Households engaged in agriculture are less likely to be food insecure, and both the 
self-employed in this sector and the labour are not represented among the first two 
categories in any of the states. This highlights the importance of agriculture to the 
population of India as a minimum support base. Agricultural labour, however, leads 
when poverty line based indicator FINSEC2 is used (Appendix Table A8). The  
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employment category ‘others’, which covers a broad range of livelihoods, appears most 
likely to be food insecure among households in all the states. Large-sized households 
are noted likely to be food insecure. The number of females has a negative effect in 
Orissa and Madhya Pradesh, perhaps a reflection of employment opportunities and 
norms for females. But the number of females has a negative relation to PWP 
participation in three states, with a positive one only in Madhya Pradesh. The link 
between the education of household head and PWP participation is not straightforward. 
Households headed by individuals with high- or middle-school education are more 
likely to be food insecure in Andhra Pradesh. This introduces the issue of employment 
opportunities for the educated, as well as suggests that the educated may prioritize other 
needs. Households headed by illiterate or only primary-educated individuals in Andhra 
Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are least likely to participate in PWPs, respectively. But 
as expected, illiterate headed households are more likely to be food insecure in Madhya 
Pradesh and West Bengal. The assumption of a stigma from participating in a support 
programme could not be founded, as households headed by persons with intermediate 
education are also involved in the work programmes. When the analysis is extended to 
religious groups, Muslims are more likely to be food insecure in all the states and the 
category ‘others’ least likely, but curiously, Muslims are found to be least likely to take 
part in the PWPs. Similarly, households of OBCs in Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal 
are more likely to be insecure while the backward, SC/ST are least likely. However, 
these groups and OBCs participate in PWP. 
When the two ‘most likely’ cases and one ‘least likely’ case for food insecurity and 
participation are matched, targeting is found to be perfect only in Orissa with respect to 
caste and region. Also the matching for caste between the two events is very good in 
Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal. Caste also indicates perfect matching when 
FINSEC2 is considered in Andhra, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. In all other cases the 
matching ranges from moderate to very poor with most matches appearing as very poor 
and none of the categories match. 
Table 13 
Characteristics of food-insecure households least likely to participate in PWP 
Andhra Pradesh  Madhya Pradesh  Orissa  West Bengal 
     
Inland-South Central    Coastal  Himalayan 
     
Self-employed 
agricultural worker 
Others Others Self-employed 
agricultural worker 
     
−  Fewer children 
−  More female 
members 
−  Large sized 
household 
−  Fewer children 
−  Less female 
members 
−  Small sized 
household 
−  Fewer children 
−  More female 
members 
−  Large sized 
household 
−  Fewer children 
−  Less female 
members 
−  Small sized 
household 
No formal education  Illiterate  SEC/HS  Primary schooling 
Others Muslim  Others  Others 
General  OBC OBC SC/ST 
Source:  Based on model results (see tables). 
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Table 13 indicates the non-participants within the food insecure by identifying those 
least likely to take part in PWPs. The least likely participants, despite food insecurity, 
include the poorly educated households in three states, the OBCs in two states, 
individuals from the ‘other’ religious group in three states. Also, self-employed 
agricultural workers in Andhra and West Bengal are also least inclined to take 
advantage of the PWPs. This is also true for household type ‘others’ in Madhya Pradesh 
and Orissa.  
5 Conclusion 
The influence of structural adjustment and globalization is pressuring the government to 
curb public expenditure, with profound impact on India’s historic regime of subsidies 
and development expenditure. There is now a need to devise instruments that attack 
deprivation in the most targeted way possible. 
Food insecurity is a form of extreme deprivation but is distinct from the conventional 
income poverty. With the progress of time, households are now faced with increasing 
range of needs that are considered to be socially essential, such as health and education. 
Households currently encounter the necessity of making choices to fulfil their multiple 
needs according to individual priorities. The Indian polity has always underscored the 
importance of food security. With macro-level food sufficiency nearly attained, 
household food insecurity resulting from inadequate purchasing power is no longer 
tolerable. A number of poverty alleviation programmes, often working through public 
works, have attempted to address poverty and food insecurity among the rural masses 
but with less than total success The household food-security measures in India have 
often been subject to difficulty of administration, run-away cost, poor targeting and in 
many cases subject to corruption or political manipulation. With the change in 
paradigm, the government has redesigned poverty and distribution programmes to effect 
greater targeting and to introduce new schemes that directly address the food needs of 
specific sections of the population. The present-day programmes are therefore more 
innovative directed at greater focus and multiple objectives.  
However, the broad based, more market consistent, productivity enhancing and, above 
all, self-selecting public works programme is the tool that has recently received more 
credence both politically and economically. Public works have been in operation in 
India over decades in different forms but now a new law is being enacted to enable 
households to legally demand wage employment through public works. While these 
employment programmes have many in-built advantages a nationwide programme 
would be costly to the budget and its superiority can be borne out only by its effective 
design to enable appropriate targeting of the needy. This paper essentially tries to look, 
using NSSO survey data, for the relationship between household food insecurity and 
participation in public works. 
Based on indications that cereals are the main dietary item in India’s rural areas and that 
they have a complementary relationship to other foods, a food security specification is 
constructed based on ICMR norm on cereal consumption. For comparison, food security 
specified as poverty in the conventional sense is also used and the relation between the 
two specifications, though positively associated, is far from being one to one. Both food 
insecurity specifications, however, indicate a positive association with PWP  
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participation as it exists. To avoid endogeneity problems with regard to econometrics, 
exogenous socioeconomic attributes associated with the incidence of food insecurity 
and participation are identified by logistic models and matched. The factors that shape 
the two different incidences are found to have limited similarity. The performance and 
design of the nationwise PWP programme would need constant monitoring for 
correcting food insecurity while economizing on public expenditure.  
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A1    Various social assurance and employment-generating programmes 
A1.1  Social assurance programme 
—  National old age pension scheme (NOAPS): Rs 75 per month to persons over 
65 years.  
—  National family benefit scheme (NFBS): Rs 10,000 as a lumpsum benefit to 
bereaved families below poverty in the event of the death of primary 
breadwinner.  
—  National maternity benefit scheme (NMBS): Rs 500 per pregnancy, for the 
first two live births.  
A1.2 Recent  employment-generating programmes for public works  
—  National food-for-work programme (FFW): Launched in 2004 in 150 most 
backward districts of the country, with the objective of intensifying the 
generation of supplementary wage employment. It is open to all rural poor who 
are in need of wage employment and wish to do manual and unskilled work. 
—  Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY): Launched in 2001, it aims to 
provide additional wage employment in all rural areas and thus improve food 
security and nutritional levels. The SGRY is open to all rural poor who need 
wage employment and are willing to do manual and unskilled work in the 
village/habitat proximity. The programme is implemented to PRI. The schemes 
Jawahar Gram Samriddhhi Yojna (JGSY) and employment assurance scheme 
(EAS) have been fully integrated with SGRY. 
—  Jayprakash Rozgar Guarantee Yojna: Operational modalities for launching of 
this scheme are being worked out (Economic Survey 2003). The scheme seeks 
to provide guaranteed employment to the unemployed in the most distressed 
districts of the country. 
—  National Rural Employment Guarantee Bill (NREG) was introduced in 
parliament in December 2004, and incorporates the following salient features 
Economic Survey 2005):  
•  State governments to provide at least 100 days of guaranteed wage 
employment in every financial year to every household whose adult 
members volunteer to do unskilled work. 
•  Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojna (SGRY) and the national 
food-for-work programme to be subsumed within the scheme once the 
Act is enforced. 
•  Until such time as a wage rate is fixed by the central government, the 
minimum wage for agricultural labourers shall be applicable for the 
scheme. 
•  An applicant not provided with employment within 15 days is to be 
entitled to a daily unemployment allowance as specified by the state 
government subject to economic capacity, provided such rate is not less 
than a quarter of the wage rate for the first 30 days during the financial  
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year and not less than a half of the wage rate for the remaining period of 
the financial year. 
•  Central Employment Guarantee Council to be constituted to discharge 
various functions and duties assigned to the Council. Every state 
government also to constitute a state council for this purpose. 
•  Panchayat at the district level to constitute a standing committee of its 
members to supervise, monitor and oversee the implementation of the 
scheme within the district. For every block, state government is to 
appoint a programme officer for implementation of the scheme. Gram 
Panchaya to be responsible for the identification of the projects as per 
the recommendations of the gram sabha and for executing and 
supervising such works. 
•  Central government to establish a national employment guarantee fund. 
State governments to establish state employment guarantee funds for the 
implementation of the scheme. 
•  The scheme to be self-selecting in the sense that those among the poor 
who need work at the minimum wage would report for work under the 
scheme. 
A2  Districts in different regions 
Andhra Pradesh 
Coastal: Srikakulam, Vizianagaram, Vishakhapatnam, East Godavari, West Godavari 
Krishna, Guntur, Prakasam, Nellore 
Inland north: Mahbubnagar, Rangareddi, Hyderabad, Medak, Nizamabad, Adilabad, 
Karimnagar, Warangal, Khammam, Nalgonda 
Southwest: Anantapur, Kurnool 
Inland south: Chittor, Cuddapah 
Madhya Pradesh 
Chattisgarh: Surguja, Bilaspur, Raigarh, Rajnandgaon, Durg Bastar, Raipur 
Vindhya: Tikamgarh, Chhatarpur, Panna, Satna, Rewa, Shahdol, Sidhi 
Central: Sagar, Damoh, Vidishah, Bhopal, Sahore, Raisen 
Malwa: Mandsaur, Ratlam, Ujjain, Shajapur, Dewas, Jhabua, Dhar, Indore, Rajgarh 
South: Jabalpur, Narsimhapur, Mandla, Chhindwara, Seoni, Balaghat 
Southwest: Khargone, Khandwa, Betul, Kosangabad 
North: Morena, Bhind, Gwalior, Datia, Shivpuri, Guna  
Orissa 
Coastal: Baleshwar, Cuttak, Ganjam, Puri 
South: Phulbani, Koraput, Kalahandi 
North: Sambhalpur, Sundargarh, Keonjhar, Mayurbhanj, Dhenkanal, Bolangir  
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West Bengal 
Himalayan: Koch, Bihar, Jalpaiguri, Darjiling 
Eastern plains: West Dinajpur, Maldah, Murshidabad, Nadia, Birbhum 
Central plains: North 24-Parganas, Calcutta, Howrah, Hooghly, Burdwan, South 
24-Parganas 
Western plains: Midnapur, Bankura, Purulya 
A3  Measures of association 
Measures of association are indexes that attempt to quantify the relationship between 
variables in cross classification. The basic hypothesis is that two variables of a cross-
tabulated table are independent of each other. The basis for the measures is the 
Pearson’s chi-square χ
2.
 The probability of an observation falling in the cell ij given as 
P(ij) worked under independence hypothesis as product of marginal probabilities of the 
two categories defining the cell. 
P(ij) = (count in row i)/N x (count in column j)/N. 
The expected number falling in cell ij is: 
E(ij)=P(ij) x N. 
The statistic then measures the difference between expected and observed number of 
observations O(i) summed over all cells to obtain: 
χ
2 = Σ Σ(O(ij)-E(ij)
2 /E(ij) 
which has a degree of freedom of (r-1) x (c-1) where r and c are number of rows and 
columns, respectively. 
To obtain information on the strength and direction of association insensitive to sample 
size also and to restrict the coefficient between 0 and 1, two other measures are used: 




(2)  Kendall tau-C (KC) is an ordinal measure that considers if cases are concordant 
or discordant or tied and a positive (negative) association is concluded with the 
preponderance of concordant (discordant) pairs: 
KC= 2m (P-Q)/N
2 (m-1)) 
Where P and Q are numbers of concordant and discordant pairs, respectively, and m is 
the smaller number of the rows and columns.  
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A4 Binary  logistic  model 
The objective function N is visualized as composed of a deterministic V part given by 
shaped by household attributes and a stochastic part ε as: 
N  = V+ ε . 
With the choice variable taking a binomial distribution, the probability of choosing an 
event is given by: 
P = Prob(Y=1) 
 =  Prob(β´X+ε>0) 
 =  Prob(ε >-β´X) . 
If the distribution is symmetric as are normal and logistic: 
P1 = Prob(ε<β´X) 
   = F(β´X)   (A.1) 
and  
P/(1-P) = F(β´X)/{1-F(β´X)}   (A.2) 
Equation (A.2) gives an expression for the odds of occurrence (or choice) of the event 
against non-occurrence in terms the cumulative distribution function F. The functional 
form of F will depend on the distribution of ε. With a logistic function as is common in 
econometric applications for mathematical convenience, the odds of occurrence of the 
event becomes: 
= Exp(β´X) 
and taking natural logs on both sides the log of odds of occurrence is. 
Log(P/(1-P) = β´X  
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Appendix 2: Tables 
Appendix Table A1 










Rural population, % (a       
GDP per capita, 1995/6 (b  9,274 6,775 6,236 8,491 10103 
Below poverty line, % (c  15.9 40.6 49.7 40.8 33.6 
Households in low expenditure group (<Rs 190), 
% 
22.2 33.3 39.63  19.8 22.2 
HDI, 2001 (d 0.416  0.394    0.404 0.472 0.472 
Villages without electricity,  %  0.08  5.63 30.14 22.79  9.33 
Households without piped water supply, %  69.0  89  76  91  70 
Area not under forests, 1996/7,  %  82.8 69.5 69.7 90.8   
Disaster index, % (e  4.96  3.50 22.07 15.66   










Instability of cereal production, % (g  12.9 10.8  6.0 25.1  7.0 
Deficit (consumption/production) (h  1.16 0.98 1.18 1.13   
Notes:  (a Census  2001;   
  (b  Gross (state) domestic product; 
  (c  Official calorie based poverty line used 1993/4; 
  (d  From GoI (2002/3); 
  (e  Takes account of disasters such as heavy rain, floods, cyclones, landslides, droughts and 
earthquakes; 
  (f  Net production excludes wastage, seed, feed, etc. and the figures in parentheses give the 
per capita net production index of cereals with ICMR norm as the base; 
  (g  Standard deviation of growth; 
  (h  Consumption indicators derived from NSSO 1993/4 data.  
Source:   Swaminathan Research Foundation (2001). 
 
 
Appendix Table A2 
Percentage of food insecure-population according to different measures 
FINSEC1 and FINSEC2 
  Andhra Pradesh    Madhya Pradesh    Orissa    West Bengal 
Region  FINSEC1  FINSEC2  FINSEC1 FINSEC2  FINSEC1 FINSEC2  FINSEC1  FINSEC2
1  46  18  45  51  18  30   31.4 27.5 
2  59  29  35  37  33  88   54.1 31.3 
3  57  40  58  39  26  50   42.6 14.0 
4  52 45    66 28          37.1  32.4 
5       57  55          
6       71  45          
7       47  23          




Appendix Table A3 
 Monthly per capita expenditure (Rs) according to education of household heads and food security status 








Education level  Insecure Secure Insecure Secure Insecure Secure  Insecure Secure
Illiterate 352  462  309  404 327.4  450.0    236  340 
No formal education, or up to 
primary schooling 
419 545  378 461  375.1  514.4    288 411 
Primary  school  444 577  365 485  388.0  511.8    368 456 
Middle  school  462 622  415 506  442.5  554.4    348 475 
Secondary or higher secondary 
school 
566 807  494 584  534.3  650.9    574 545 
Higher  education  775 924  586 896  648.0  770.3    658 634 
Note:  Food insecurity measure = FINSEC1. 
Source:   Computed from NSSO data. 
Appendix Table A4 
 Distribution of households by education level of household head 
Education  Andhra Pradesh  Madhya Pradesh  West Bengal  Orissa 
Illiterate 64.9  52.9 41.4  48.8 
No formal education, or up to 
primary schooling 
13.6 18.9  22.2  25.1 
Primary school  7.4  12.0  13.6  6.6 
Middle school  6.3  7.8  12.8  11.8 
Secondary or higher secondary 
school 
6.5 6.7  7.4  6.0 
Higher education  1.4 1.6  2.7  1.7 
Note:  See Appendix Table A3. 
Source:   Computed from NSSO data. 
Appendix TableA5 
 Nominal and ordinal association among variables 
 FINSEC1  PWP 
 Contingency  coeff.   Kendal’s tau-C  Contingency coeff.  Kendal’s tau-C 
Andhra Pradesh         
FINSEC2 0.289  0.267  0.003  -0.001 
Participation in PWP  0.027  -0.007     
          
Madhya Pradesh         
FINSEC2 0.261  0.266  0.038  0.013 
Participation in PWP   0.025  0.009     
          
West Bengal         
FINSEC2 0.324  0.297  0.048  0.013 
Participation in PWP  0.043  0.013     
          
Orissa        
FINSEC2 0.279  0.247  0.049  0.019 
Participation in PWP  0.026  0.008     
Note:  FINSEC1 and FINSEC2 = Food insecurity indices. 
  All measures are found significant at 0.01 level. 
Source:  Computed by authors.  
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Appendix Table A8 
Characteristics of households likely to be food insecure 
according to FINSEC2 
  Andhra Pradesh  Madhya Pradesh  Orissa  West Bengal 
Most likely  −  Inland 
−  South 
−  Southwest 
−  South 
−  Chhattisgarh 
−  South  
−  North 
−  Western plains  
−  Himalayan 
      
Least likely  −  Coastal  −  Malwa  −  Coastal  −  Central plains 
      
Most likely  −  Agricultural labour 
−  Others 
−  Other labour  
−  Agricultural labour
−  Agricultural labour 
−  Other labour 
−  Agricultural labour
−  Other labour 
      
Least likely  −  Self-employed 
agricultural 
worker 
−  Others  −  Others  −  Others 
      
Most likely  −  More children 
−  More females 
members 
−  Large sized 
household 
−  More children 
−  More females 
members 
−  Small sized 
household 
−  More children  
−  More females 
members 
−  Large sized 
household 
−  More children  
−  More females 
members 
−  Large sized 
household 
      
Most likely  −  Illiterate 
−  No formal 
education 
−  Illiterate 
−  Primary school 
−  Illiterate 
−  No formal 
education 
−  Illiterate 
−  No formal 
education 
Least  likely  SEC/HS Middle  SEC/HS SEC/HS 
Most likely  Muslim, Hindu  Muslim, Hindu  Hindu, Muslim  Others, Muslim 
Least  likely  Others Others Others Hindu 
Most likely  SC/ST OBC  SC/ST OBC  SC/ST OBC  SC/ST General 
Least  likely  General General General OBC 













Appendix Table A6 
Binary logistic model for food insecurity 
Part 1: Andhra Pradesh  
  FINSEC1  FINSEC2 
  Coefficient (B) Significance  Exp(B) Coefficient (B)  Significance Exp(B)
   
  ANDHRA PRADESH 
Region (base = inland south)          
Coastal -0.169  0.001  0.845  -1.577  0.001  0.207
Inland north  0.309  0.001  1.363  -1.107  0.001  0.331
Southwestern 0.074  0.001  1.077  -0.554  0.002  0.573
           
Household type (base = others)          
Self-employed, nonagriculture  0.612 0.001  1.845   0.454 0.002  1.575
Agriculture labour  0.297 0.001  1.346   0.347 0.001  1.415
Other labour  0.140 0.001  1.150   0.656 0.001  1.927
Self-employed agriculture  0.520 0.001  1.683   0.233 0.002  1.262
           
Education of head (base = secondary 





Illiterate -0.450  0.001  0.637  0.985  0.002  2.677
No formal education/ up to 





Primary school  -0.137  0.002 0.872   0.318  0.002  1.375
Middle school  -0.116  0.002 0.891   0.320  0.003  1.377
            
Household properties           
Size 0.135  0.000  1.14   0.185  0.000  1.203
Child-ratio 1.794  0.002  6.02   2.935  0.003  8.813
Adult female-ratio  0.472  0.003 1.60    1.124 0.004  3.677
           
Minority religion (base = Hinduism)          
Islam -0.045  0.002  0.956  0.006  0.002  1.006
Others -0.074  0.002  0.929  -0.076  0.002  0.927
            
Caste (base = general)           
SC/ST -0.081  0.001  0.922  1.225  0.001  3.403
OBCs 0.020  0.001  1.02   0.786  0.001  2.195
            
Constant  -1.179 0.002      -4.36  0.003 






Appendix Table A6 
Binary logistic model for food insecurity 
Part 2: Mahdya Pradesh  
  FINSEC1  FINSEC2 
 Coefficient  (B) Significance  Exp(B) Coefficient (B) Significance  Exp(B)
   
  MAHDYA PRADESH 
Region (base = north)          
Chattisgarh  -0.159 0.0011  0.853   0.949  0.0013  2.58 
Vindhya  -0.614 0.0012  0.541   0.420  0.0014  1.52 
Central  0.282 0.013  1.325   0.368 0.0015  1.445 
Malwa  0.583 0.0011  1.792    -0.242 0.0014  0.7852
South  0.352 0.0012  1.422   1.237 0.0014  3.445 
Southwest  0.917 0.0014  2.503   0.472 0.0015  1.603 
           
Household type (base = other)           
Self-employed, nonagriculture  0.611 0.0014  1.843    -0.2169 0.0017  0.8050
Agriculture labour  0.579 0.0011  1.784   0.2109 0.0012  1.235 
Other labour  0.399 0.0007  1.490   0.8715 0.0007  2.391 
Self-employed agriculture  0.515 0.0015  1.673   0.9190 0.0016  2.507 
           
Education of head (base = secondary 





Illiterate  -0.087 0.0012  0.916   0.734  0.0015  2.083 
No formal education/ up to 
primary school 
-0.273 0.0013  0.761   0.207  0.0016  1.230 
Primary school  -0.317 0.0013  0.728   0.317  0.0016  1.374 
Middle school  -0.215 0.0015  0.806    -0.310 0.0018  0.733 
            
Household properties              
Size  0.042 0.000  1.043   0.087 0.0001  1.091 
Child-ratio  2.042 0.002  7.703   3.148 0.0024  23.29 
Adult female-ratio  -0.055 0.003  0.946   0.454  0.004  1.575 
           
Minority religion (base = Hinduism)           
Islam  0.606 0.0016  1.833   0.190  0.002  1.209 
Others  -0.023 0.0028  0.977   -0.705 0.003  0.994 
            
Caste (base = general)              
SC/ST  0.130 0.001  1.139   1.418 0.001  4.13 
OBCs  0.155 0.001  1.168   0.720 0.001  2.06 
            
Constant  -1.355  0.002     -4.752 0.003   
          Table  A6  continues 




Appendix Table A6 
Binary logistic model for food insecurity 
Part 3: Orissa  
  FINSEC1  FINSEC2 
  Coefficient (B) Significance  Exp(B) Coefficient (B)  Significance Exp(B)
   
  ORISSA 
Region (base = north)        
Coastal  -0.497 0.001  0.608  -0.729 0.0011  0.482
South  0.257 0.001  1.293  1.974 0.0016  7.202
        
Household type (base = other)        
Self-employed, nonagriculture  0.505 0.002  1.666  -0.506 0.0018  0.603
Agriculture labour  -0.072 0.002  0.93  -0.037 0.0016  0.963
Other labour  0.0019 0.001  1.00 0.591 0.0012  1.806
Self-employed agriculture  0.104 0.002  1.111  0.506 0.0026  1.659
        
Education of head (base = secondary 
or higher secondary) 
    
 
Illiterate  0.126 0.002  1.135  1.819 0.003  6.164
No formal education/ up to 
primary school 
0.012 0.002  1.012  1.236 0.003  3.441
Primary school  0.312 0.003  1.366  1.210 0.003  3.355
Middle school  0.150 0.002  1.161  0.978 0.003  2.659
          
Household properties          
Size  0.015 0.002  1.015  0.058 0.002  1.060
Child-ratio  2.42 0.003  1.26  3.790 0.003  44.24
Adult female-ratio  -0.002 0.005  0.998  1.242 0.004  3.462
        
Minority religion (base = Hinduism)        
Islam  0.017 0.004  1.012  -0.008 0.005  0.992
Others  -0.300 0.003  0.741  -0.206 0.003  0.813
          
Caste (base = general)          
SC/ST  0.085 0.0014  1.089  0.934 0.0014  2.545
OBCs  0.042 0.0014  1.043  0.383 0.0014  1.467
          
Constant  -2.245 0.004    -4.386  0.004 






Appendix Table A6 
Binary logistic model for food insecurity 
Part 4: West Bengal 
  FINSEC1  FINSEC2 
 Coefficient  (B) Significance  Exp(B) Coefficient (B) Significance  Exp(B)
   
  WEST BENGAL 
          
Region (base = western plains)        
Himalayan -0.411  0.0012  0.663 -0.711  0.0013  0.491
Eastern plains  0.414  0.0008 1.513  -0.733  0.0010  0.480
Central plains  0.073  0.0008 1.076  -1.524  0.0010  0.218
        
Household type (base = other)        
Self-employed, nonagriculture  0.741 0.0012  2.097  -0.150 0.0018  0/861
Agriculture labour  0.439 0.0009  1.551  0.253 0.0011  1.288
Other labour  0.439 0.008  1.551  0.894 0.0010  2.446
Self-employed agriculture  0.539 0.0014  1.714  0.521 0.0017  1.685
        
Education of head (base = secondary 
or higher secondary) 
    
 
Illiterate  0.318 0.0012  1.374  1.544 0.002  4.684
No formal education/ up to 
primary school 
0.365 0.0013  1.440  1.088 0.002  2.969
Primary school  0.151 0.0013  1.163  0.928 0.002  2.529
Middle school  0.310 0.0013  1.363  0.580 0.002  1.726
         
Household properties         
Size  0.093 0.001  1.098  0.119 0.001  1.126
Child-ratio  1.819 0.002  6.164  3.409 0.003  30.24
Adult female-ratio  0.846 0.003  2.330  2.017 0.004 7.51
        
Minority religion (base = Hinduism)        
Islam  0.308 0.0080  1.361  0.413 0.001  1.511
Others  0.521 0.023  1.684  1.142 0.003  3.133
         
Caste (base = general)         
SC/ST  -0.016 0.0008  0.984 0.606 0.001  1.833
OBCs  -0.010 0.0012  0.990  -0.624 0.002  0.976
            






Appendix Table A7 
Binary logistic model for participation in PWP 
Part I: Andhra Pradesh 
  Without control for food insecurity  With control for food insecurity 
  Coefficient (B) Significance  Exp(B) Coefficient (B)  Significance Exp(B)
   
  ANDHRA PRADESH 
       
Constant -2.929  0.008  -3.58  0.017   
        
Region (base = inland south)        
Coastal 0.129  0.004  1.14 1.19  0.011  3.28 
Inland north   -0.374  0.004 0.69  1.07 0.011  2.91 
Southwest -1.135  0.008  0.32 0.706  0.0013  2.03 
          
Household type (base = other)          
Self-employed, nonagriculture  -0.186 0.005  0.83  0.430 0.007  1.537 
Agriculture labour  -0.839 0.005  0.43 -1.066 0.009  0.344 
Other labour  -0.228 0.003  0.79  0.171 0.005  1.186 
Self-employed agriculture  -0.060 0.005  0.94  0.189 0.007  1.208 
          






Illiterate  -0.06 0.004  0.348 -1.001 0.005  0.367 
No formal education or up to 
primary school 
-0.78 0.005  0.168 -3.22 0.015  0.039 
Primary school  -2.55 0.009  0.078 -2.12 0.014  0.119 
Middle school  -1.00 0.006  0.367 -1.24 0.009  0.288 
           
Household properties           
Size  -0.022 0.006  0.98 -0.206 0.001  0.814 
Child-ratio  0.915 0.007  0.40  0.597 0.013  1.817 
Adult female-ratio  -0.478 0.009  0.02 -2.914 0.021  0.053 
          
Minority religion (base = Hinduism)          
Islam  -0.274 0.009  0.76  0.441 0.010  1.55 
Others  -0.461 0.005  1.59 -4.866 0.108  0.008 
           
Caste (base = general)           
SC/ST  1.088 0.004  2.97  1.17 0.007  3.24 
OBCs  0.775 0.004  2.17  0.86 0.006  2.37 





Appendix Table A7 
Binary logistic model for participation in PWP 
Part 2: Madhya Pradesh 
  Without control for food insecurity With control for food insecurity 
 Coefficient  (B) Significance  Exp(B) Coefficient (B) Significance  Exp(B)
   
  MADHYA PRADESH 
Constant -4.370  0.007    -3.319  0.009   
           
Region (base = north)           
Chattisgarh -0.944  0.003  0.389   -0.679  0.003  0.507 
Vindhya -0.689  0.003  0.502   -0.691  0.004  0.5501
Central -2.911  0.007  0.054   -7.681  0.095  0.0005
Malwa -0.670  0.003  0.512   -0.933  0.004  0.393 
South -0.884  0.003  0.413   -0.856  0.004  0.425 
Southwest 0.566  0.003  0.568   -0.520  0.004  0.595 
            
Household type (base = other)          
Self-employed, nonagriculture  0.086 0.005  1.09    -6.176 0.112  0.0021
Agriculture labour  0.802  0.003 2.23    0.999 0.003  2.714 
Other labour  0.645  0.002  1.90   0.795  0.002 2.214 
Self-employed agriculture  1.281 0.003  3.60    1.012 0.004  2.752 
           
Education of head (base = secondary 





Illiterate 0.494  0.004 1.639    -0.126 0.005  0.882 
No formal education or up to 
primary school 
0.664 0.005  1.943    0.149 0.005  1.162 
Primary school  0.543  0.005 1.722    0.111  0.006  1.117 
Middle school  0.430  0.005  1.538   0.019  0.008  1.019 
             
Household properties             
Size -0.007  0.003  0.993   0.021  0.003  1.021 
Child-ratio 0.527  0.005  1.694   0.218  0.008  1.244 
Adult female-ratio  0.345  0.008 1.411    0.258 0.013  1.295 
           
Minority religion (base = Hinduism)           
Islam -0.682  0.006  0.506   -0.885  0.008  0.413 
Others 1.144  0.005  3.138   0.522  0.007  1.686 
             
Caste (base = general)             
SC/ST 0.801  0.003  2.228   0.241  0.003  1.272 
OBCs 0.298  0.003  1.347   -0.217  0.003  0.805 






Appendix Table A7 
Binary logistic model for participation in PWP 
Part 3: Orissa 
  Without control for food insecurity  With control for food insecurity 
  Coefficient (B) Significance  Exp(B) Coefficient (B)  Significance Exp(B)
   
  ORISSA 
Constant  -8.568  0.366   -5.35 0.009   
          
Region (base = north)        
Coastal -0.397  0.006  0.527   -0.397  0.003  0.672 
South 0.550  0.005  1.495   0.550  0.002  1.734 
North         
        
Household type (base = other)        
Self-employed, nonagriculture  -7.76 0.232  0.0009  0.374  0.005  1.453 
Agriculture labour  0.125 0.010  1.133    -0.172 0.006  0.842 
Other labour  0.527 0.006  1.694    0.934 0.003  2.545 
Self-employed agriculture  2.494 0.007  12.048   3.051 0.004  21.141
        
Education of head (base = secondary 
or higher secondary) 
    
 
Illiterate  6.137 0.366  462.5    -0.067 0.005  0.935 
No formal education or up to 
primary school 
7.148 0.366  1270.9   0.252 0.005  1.286 
Primary school  6.594 0.366  730.7    -0.793 0.008  0.452 
Middle school  6.518  0.366  677.5   -0.062  0.006 0.939 
          
Household properties          
Size  -0.232 0.001  0.793   0.088  0.004  1.092 
Child-ratio  0.576 0.018  1.78    -0.223 0.007  0.800 
Adult female-ratio  -4.96 0.033  0.007    -0.104 0.010  0.900 
        
Minority religion (base = Hinduism)        
Islam  -5.77 0.815  0.003    -3.67 0.096  0.025 
Others  -7.95 0.610  0.0004  0.658  0.005  1.932 
         
Caste (base = general)         
SC/ST  1.299 0.010  3.669    1.206 0.004  3.34 
OBCs  -0.155 0.011  0.857   0.632  0.005  1.88 







Appendix Table A7 
Binary logistic model for participation in PWP 
Part 4: West Bengal 
  Without control for food insecurity  With control for food insecurity 
 Coefficient  (B) Significance  Exp(B) Coefficient (B) Significance  Exp(B)
   
  WEST BENGAL 
Constant  -3.192 0.009    -3.298 0.006   
          
Region (base = western plains)        
Himalayan -2.642  0.010  0.071   -0.666  0.003 0.513 
Eastern plains  -1.416  0.003 0.243    -1.182  0.002  0.306 
Central plains  -1.767  0.003 0.171    -1.462  0.002  0.232 
        
Household type (base = other)        
Self-employed, nonagriculture  0.789 0.005  2.201    1.009 0.003  2.743 
Agriculture labour  0.570 0.004  1.768    0.644 0.003  1.905 
Other labour  0.387 0.004  1.472    0.658 0.003  1.930 
Self-employed agriculture  0.846 0.006  2.330    0.897 0.004  2.453 
        
Education of head (base = secondary 
or higher secondary) 
    
 
Illiterate  0.463 0.005  1.589    0.572 0.004  1.772 
No formal education or up to 
primary school 
-0.388 0.005  0.679    -0.242 0.000  0.785 
Primary school  -1.620 0.008  0.198    -0.975 0.005  0.377 
Middle school  0.314 0.005  1.368    0.6 0.004  1.057 
          
Household properties          
Size  0.062 0.0004  1.064   0.041  0.003  1.041 
Child-ratio  0.1114 0.009  1.118    -0.410 0.006  0.663 
Adult female-ratio  0.175 0.013  1.192    -0.981 0.009  0.375 
        
Minority religion (base = Hinduism)        
Islam  -0.569 0.004  0.566    -0.393 0.003  0.675 
Others  -0.602 0.010  0.548   0.188  0.006  1.207 
         
Caste (base = general)         
SC/ST  -0.197 0.003  -0.023   -0.193  0.002  0.824 








Appendix Table A8 
Predictive power of the model 
  Andhra Pradesh  Madhya Pradesh Orissa  West Bengal 
Food insecurity FINSEC1         
Predicted % (occurrence)  71  69  25  46 
Predicted % (non-occurrence)  52  59  99  76 
Predicted %   62  64  76  63 
       
Food insecurity FINSEC2         
Predicted % (occurrence)  30  64  71  29 
Predicted % (non-occurrence)  93  79  80  93 
Predicted %   76  73  76  77 
       
Participation  (uncontrolled)       
Predicted % ( occurrence)  76  77  82  76 
Predicted % (non-occurrence)  50  51  51  51 
Predicted %   51  52  52  51 
       
Participation (controlled)    78     
Predicted % (occurrence)  90  51  90  85 
Predicted % (non-occurrence)  51  53  53  51 
Predicted %   51  52  54  52 
Note:   The occurrence or non-occurrence of an event is decided on the basis of estimated probabilities. 
The cutoff point for the decision is as usual 0.5 for food insecurity, but since participation is 
unbalanced a cutoff equal to the median value of the estimated probabilities is considered.  
42 
Acronyms 
AAY  Antodaya Anna Yojana (grain scheme for the poorest of the poor) 
APL individuals  living  above the poverty line 
BPL individuals  living  below the poverty line 
CMP common  minimum  programme 
DPAP  drought prone area programme  
EAS  employment assurance scheme 
FCI  Food Corporation of India 
GDP  gross domestic product 
GSs  Gram sabha 
HDI  human development index  
ICDS  integrated child development services programme  
ICMR  Indian Council of Medical Research 
JRY  Jawahar Rozhar Yojana 
MDM midday  meal  schedule 
MPCE  monthly per capita expenditure  
NFBS  national family benefit scheme  
FFW  food-for-work programme  
NMBS  national maternity benefit scheme  
NOAPS  national old age pension scheme  
NREP   national rural employment programme  
NREG  national rural employment guarantee programme    
NSAP   national social assistance programme 
NSSO  National Sample Survey Organization of India  
OBCs  other backward classes 
OMS  open market sales  
PDS  public distribution system 
PRI Panchayati  Raj  institution 
RLEGP rural  landless  employment guarantee programme  
SC/ST  schedule castes and schedule tribes  
TPDS  targeted public distribution system 
PWPs   public works programmes  
WTO    World Trade Organization 